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Abstract: In his paper, "The Problematics of a Social Constructivist Approach to Science," Bryce 
Christensen takes John Gray's hope that science can serve as a remedy for anthropocentrism as 
an entry point for discussing the debate between scientific realists and social constructivists. Chris-
tensen examines the way science appears to buttress the realist position when it confronts hu-
mans with truths that contradict their expectations and desires. In his discussion, Christensen also 
surveys the ways that science fits within social constructivist theory when it serves identifiable so-
cial needs or advances identifiable group interests. Further, Christensen identifies eschatological 
cosmology as an extreme test case for social constructivism because its bleak final predictions do 
not serve any of the group interests that social constructivists typically highlight as the driving 
force in their theoretical paradigm. Christensen concludes by suggesting that when social construc-
tivists insist that their theory accounts for all of science, they risk creating a quasi-theological jus-
tification for new Inquisitors of the sort who once condemned Galileo for reporting observations 
that did not fit within their worldview. 
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The Problematics of a Social Constructivist Approach to Science 
 
As part of a highly provocative commentary on modern science, British philosopher John Gray urg-
es scientists to use their work as a "remedy for anthropocentrism" (23). Scientists are uniquely 
qualified to proffer such a remedy, Gray believes, because they have opened a dark and chaotic 
cosmic vista that is "intensely uncomfortable to the human mind" (23), a vista within which hu-
mans are "one of the most predatory and destructive" of species, yet one that "can no more be 
masters of their destiny than any other animal" (4). Unfortunately, in Gray's opinion, to date, sci-
entists have done relatively little to deploy their research as the much-needed antidote to anthro-
pocentrism that he seeks. Quite otherwise. Instead, "science has been used to support the conceit 
that humans are unlike all other animals in their ability to understand the world" (24). Indeed, 
"science supports the myth of progress" (19), Gray complains, and even "promises that the most 
ancient human fantasies will at last be realized. Sickness and ageing will be abolished; scarcity and 
poverty will be no more; the species will become immortal" (123). As much as he would like to see 
science puncture human illusions about the centrality and omnipotence of homo sapiens, Gray fi-
nally acknowledges that this can never be. "Science," he resignedly concedes, "will never be used 
chiefly to pursue truth. ... The uses of knowledge will always be as shifting and crooked as humans 
themselves" (28). Hence, to regard science as "the disinterested pursuit of truth" is "to ignore the 
human needs science serves" (18). With his provocative two-sided assessment of science, Gray 
adopts a very peculiar position in an on-going and often contentious academic debate that pits sci-
entific realists on the one hand against social constructivists on the other. At stake in this debate is 
the very nature of science: for scientific realists, science proceeds by discovering and verifying 
empirical realities; for social constructivists, science proceeds by inventing a plausible means of 
interpreting nature and then persuading colleagues and the general public to believe in it. When 
Gray acknowledges the power of scientists to perceive "uncomfortable" truths that contradict hu-
man expectations and desires, he lends credibility to scientific realists who assert that their disci-
pline gives them direct access to realities that have not been socially constructed. However, what 
Gray gives with one hand, he withdraws with the other. For in arguing that because science serves 
human needs, its darker and least anthropocentric findings will usually be ignored, Gray largely 
endorses the premises of social constructivism. Nonetheless, in drawing back from a thoroughgo-
ing endorsement, Gray still grants science to power to expose -- even if only occasionally -- the 
limits of social constructivism (for a collection of constructivist work, see Riegler's Radical Con-
structivism website at <http://www.radicalconstructivism.com>; on constructivism and the hu-
manities, see also Tötösy at 
<http://clcwebjournal.lib.purdue.edu/library/totosy(constructivism).html>). Gray's views on sci-
ence thus illuminate both the strengths and inadequacies of a theory of cultural development that 
has in recent decades grown remarkably influential in academic discourse. 
When he is focusing on its too-rarely-used power to expose truths "uncomfortable" to the hu-
man mind, Gray acknowledges what many scientists and scholars of science insist upon: that sci-
ence proceeds by the objective verification of empirical realities that exist independent of human 
desires or expectations. This belief in the objectivity of science indeed informs the popular or 
common view of the scientific enterprise. In sharp contrast, social constructivists view science (or 
any other system of meaning) as an invention born of human needs and reflecting human desires. 
Social constructivists thus do not regard science as a process of objective discovery and empirical 
verification. Speaking from the social constructivist perspective, German critic Wolf Lepenies 
writes: "Science must no longer give the impression it represents a faithful reflection of reality. 
What it is, rather, is a cultural system, and it exhibits to us an alienated interest-determined image 
of reality specific to a definite time and place" (64). Likewise developing the social constructivist 
perspective, American sociologists Bruno Latour and Steve Woolgar dismiss the possibility that 
scientists are exposing "some entity with an independent existence 'out there'" in their experi-
mental research: "We do not conceive of scientists," they continue, "as pulling back the curtain on 
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pre-given, but hitherto concealed truths. Rather, objects ... are constituted through the artful 
creativity of scientists" (qtd. in Bailey 165). In the same spirit, social constuctivists Egon G. Guba 
and Yvonna S. Lincoln challenge as naïve the view that "knowledge" is something they have "dis-
covered" (69). Guba and Lincoln thus dismiss as untenable the belief that science can ever estab-
lish "the truth of any proposition" by "testing it empirically in the natural world" and the concomi-
tant belief that "facts can be uncovered and arrayed independently of the values that may later be 
brought to bear to interpret and give meaning to them" (69). Articulating central social construc-
tivist doctrines, Guba and Lincoln insist that "the 'truth' [note the skeptical quotation marks 
around the word] of any proposition (its credibility) can be determined by submitting it 
semiotically" to "qualified persons." "Constructivist 'truth'" (note those quotation marks around 
truth again!) thus emerges in "tentative agreements or consensus among [those] who find the 
proposition credible" (104-05). What happens in social constructivism is that, in the words of cul-
tural historian Ernst Gellner, "objective truth is ... replaced by hermeneutic truth" (35). Empirical 
fact simply dissolves in a sea of social interpretation. Predictably enough, in that sea of interpreta-
tion, it is the self-interest of the interpreters that bobs to the surface -- in science as in every oth-
er human pursuit. "Since all knowledge is social construction," explains one commentator, "scien-
tists are [as] self-serving and unreliable [as anyone else] ... and anything [they] state as truth is 
suspect" (Raymo C2).  
Because he sees modern science perpetuating "ancient human fantasies" of human centrality 
and omnipotence as it serves the "shifting and crooked "needs of truth-averse human, Gray can 
only be sympathetic to social constructivist views of science. However, the glosses that social con-
structivists put on their work enrage scientists who believe their research does in truth (no quota-
tion marks) give them direct access to empirical realities. Biologist Richard Dawkins, for instance, 
ridicules theorists whose social constructionist doctrines imply that "a tribe which believes that the 
moon is an old calabash tossed just above the treetops ... [holds a view] just as true as our scien-
tific belief that the moon is a large Earth satellite about a quarter of a million miles away" (qtd. in 
Bailey 166). Such theorists, Dawkin asserts, betray the inadequacy of their doctrines every time 
they make a journey by relying on aerospace engineers rather than flying-carpet fabulists. "Show 
me a cultural relativist [i.e., a social constructivist] at 30,000 feet and I will show you a hypocrite," 
he writes (qtd. in Bailey 166). Indulging in a similar spirit of mockery, science writer A.K. Dewdney 
who finds in the way "a stone thrown in a vacuum will [actually] execute a parabola with a preci-
sion great enough to rule out any other polynomial function as a possible path" ample justification 
for ridiculing social constructivists who suppose that "Galileo and Newton lay this fantasy upon us 
because they were Italian or English" or because they were "expressing a post-Renaissance yearn-
ing for perfection" (2-3). "Anyone," Dewdney adds derisively, "who thinks that a social construc-
tion lurks in the labors of Kepler (who put the [Copernican] theory on a solid footing with his dis-
covery of elliptical orbits) should read of research driven purely by the observational data of Tycho 
Brahe, and learn of Kepler's frustration when he discovered that the one social construction he did 
attempt, the 'mysterium cosmographicum,' was a dismal failure. It did not fit the data" (7-8). Bi-
ographer Giuliano Pancaldi adds the name of Alessandro Volta to the list of scientists who in some 
measure seem to have grasped realities not socially constructed within their own culture. Pancaldi 
freely acknowledges that the "constructivist notion" explains very well why, once Volta had discov-
ered how to make an electric storage battery, "any expert electrician in Europe could bend the 
battery to his or her own particular intellectual and social needs." However, he insists that only 
"the realist notion" can account for the fact that "the voltaic batteries built throughout Europe in 
the early nineteenth century were basically the same device" (4). 
In his arguments for a realist rather than a social-constructivist approach to science, philoso-
pher Robert Fogelin focuses not on early nineteenth-century electrical batteries that worked but 
rather on a late-twentieth-century telescope that failed. The initial failure of the orbiting Hubble 
Telescope, Fogelin reasons, "illustrates what it is like to encounter reality -- to be constrained by 
it" (138). And "when the instrument was failing," Fogelin remarks, "nobody suggested that it took 
a telescope as powerful as the Hubble to show how fuzzy stars really are. There are certain things 
that you can't talk your way out of" (138). Fogelin thus takes the Hubble episode as paradigmatic 
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of the way that empirical science "provides a check against our thought" (187), its experiments 
and observations confronting would-be social constructivists with what C.S. Pierce calls an "exter-
nal permanency ... something upon which our thinking has no effect" (qtd. in Fogelin 126). To the 
degree that science directly grasps some "external permanency," it transcends "the human needs" 
that -- Gray complains -- so frequently convert science into a prop for anthropocentric illusions. 
Indeed, if social constructivism rests upon the premise that human desires -- socially negotiated -- 
shape all meaning, then empirical science challenges that premise by silencing those desires, at 
least in certain experimental contexts. "Empiricism," the intercultural scholar W.E. Hocking ex-
plains, "is ... a form of self-denial, a moral will to let the object speak for itself. Empiricism holds 
that if we allow it to do so, the object will speak, i.e. that truth is accessible" (qtd. in Fernandez-
Armesto 120). The nineteenth-century American scientist Joseph Henry went even further in set-
ting empirical science apart from the human desires informing social constructivism. For he gave 
the merely human self-denial of empiricism a theological cast, remarking just before performing an 
experiment that "We are going to ask God a question. Let us pray that we do not miss his answer 
when He gives it to us" (qtd. in Atalay 24). A doctrinaire social constructivist would, of course, 
dismiss Henry's language as precisely the kind of deceptive and self-serving rhetoric that clerics 
often used to advance their cultural and social interests -- their "shifting and crooked" human 
needs -- long before scientists like Henry took it over for their own ends. No transcendent or su-
perhuman Deity speaks through scientific experiments, in their view, any more than he speaks 
through popes and bishops. To be sure, social constructivists often do concede the existence of an 
"external permanency" outside of the hermeneutic circle within which society interprets that per-
manency. However, for social constructivists, that external permanency remains remarkably mute. 
For social constructivists, empirical experiments on that external permanency never enable "the 
object [to] speak for itself" and so never make truth directly "accessible." Rather, empirical exper-
iments merely make new material available for interpreters to work with in their hermeneutic and 
rhetorical labors. For social constructivists, the final test of "truth" (quotation marks obligatory) is 
social acceptance, not empirical verification. Social constructivist Humberto Maturana asserts con-
sequently that "scientific explanations do not explain an independent objective reality" 
(<http://www.inteco.cl/biology/>). Explaining that all "new domains of reality" are the constructs 
"we bring forth in a community of observers" as the "praxis of living" enmeshes us in "the happen-
ing of being human, in the languaging of language," Maturana concludes that "science, modern 
science, as a cognitive domain is not an exception to this" (secs. 4, 11). The prominent social con-
structivist Siegfried J. Schmidt rejects likewise the views of scientific realists when he argues that 
the putative "objects" of scientific research are "not objects in an ontological sense," that indeed 
"scientists do not talk about objects; instead they talk about phenomena and problems. Phenome-
na and problems, however, do not exist in themselves; they exist only in relation to scientists, 
which is to say in relation to knowledge, interests, needs, and preferences in sociohistorical situa-
tions" (624-25). To be sure, in the social constructivist view, empirical data may affect 
sociohistorical situations by making certain lines of interpretation more difficult to maintain than 
others, but such data never reveal a definitive and objective truth and never constitute the divine 
voice Henry sought to hear through empirical experimentation.  
But the likelihood that scientists make contact if not with deity at least with reality -- and not a 
socially constructed reality at that -- seems particularly high when those scientists report findings 
which can serve no discernible social purpose. Such findings are no doubt those that Gray has in 
mind when writing about the "remedy for anthropocentrism" which scientists provide when their 
work delivers a mental perspective that is "intensely uncomfortable to the human mind" (23). Sci-
ence can indeed deliver discomfort on many different levels. For instance, when Louis Godin and 
Charles-Marie de la Condamine led an expedition to South America in the 1730's while Pierre-Louis 
Moreau de Maupertuis led simultaneously an expedition they led to Lapland, scientific discomfort 
took the form of an affront to national pride. For although most educated Frenchmen of the time 
hoped that these dual expeditions -- long, arduous, and dangerous -- would provide empirical veri-
fication for the geophysics of their countryman René Descartes, their observations provided no 
such verification. Instead of showing that the earth was prolonged at the poles and drawn in at the 
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equator -- as Descartes had asserted -- the French scientific establishment had to admit (with 
keen disappointment) that observations made by their own countrymen indicated that the earth 
was actually bulged at the equator, just as Descartes's widely disparaged British rival Newton had 
predicted (King-Hele 89). Although they voiced no patriotic hopes of the sort expressed by Godin 
and Condamine and company when they set out on their eighteenth-century expedition to South 
America, the British astronomers Arthur Eddington and Edwin Cottingham were well aware that if 
the data they collected in 1919 from the Island of Principe confirmed the predictions of Albert Ein-
stein on the gravitational bending of light, such confirmation would enhance the scientific status of 
a bitter foe, Germany, at the expense of the long-dominant science of their own country and its 
scientific titan, Isaac Newton. Perhaps such national chauvinism helps explain why even after Ed-
dington and Cottingham reported data in close agreement with Einstein's predictions and at odds 
with Newtonian formulae, some British scientists (including Sir Oliver Lodge, principal of Birming-
ham University and Oliver Heaviside, winner of the Nobel prize in physics in 1906) still rejected 
Einstein's theory as "drivel" and as a perspective "repugnant to commonsense" (Brian 101-02). 
Social constructivists can, of course, explain such chauvinistic and hostile responses to Einstein 
very well. They can further explain why Nazi scientists within Germany attacked Einstein's theories 
as "Jewish science" (Brian 101-02). Because the empirical verification of Einstein's science brought 
with it considerable discomfort, these scientists simply tried to ignore it in ways that satisfied their 
"shifting and crooked" human desires. These scientific foes of Einstein sought refuge in a "herme-
neutic truth" that explained away the data threatening their interests. All of this fits satisfactorily 
within constructivist doctrines. What does not fit so well within social constructivism, however, is 
the eventual success of scientists such as Eddington and Cottingham in winning virtually universal 
acceptance for Einstein's theories by wielding their empirical data against the hermeneutic illusions 
of skeptics. Ultimately, this data proved so potent that even scientists loyal to the Nazi regime -- 
including Ludwig Prandtl and Werner Heisenberg -- embraced and used Einstein's physics, despite 
the keen disapproval of party leaders (Brian 308). Given the murderous way in which the Nazis 
dealt with dissidents on even small issues, it is hard to see how German scientists such as Prandtl 
and Heisenberg were in any way engaging in a hermeneutic act that advanced their interests when 
they embraced Einstein's empirically verified science. Rather, it would appear that for the sake of 
its objective truth, such scientists accepted the real ideological discomfort such "Jewish science" 
occasioned. 
With enough ingenuity and persistence, social constructivists could nonetheless represent the 
labors of Eddington and Cottingham, Prandtl and Heisenberg not as those of scientists who laid 
hold upon Einstein's theory as a guide to empirical reality but rather as those of members of an 
international hermeneutic community devising meanings that eluded the control of particular party 
and national elites. These social constructivists might even assert that despite the risk they ran 
within their national or party circumstances by doing so, these scientists actually reinforced the 
privileges of their gender, race, and class by helping to advance a rationalist and empiricist mode 
of discourse that has always favored affluent white males -- like themselves. Perhaps such social 
constructivist reasoning might persuade those who can see the numerous accomplished female 
and non-Caucasian scientists -- such as astronomers Maria Mitchell and Subrhmanyan 
Chandraselahar and physicists Marie Curie and Chien-Shiung Wu -- as merely so many colonized 
minds, although such a view will strike many as terribly patronizing and condescending. But the 
true acid test for social constructivism comes out of what may be termed eschatological cosmolo-
gy. Such cosmology is so "intensely uncomfortable to the human mind," so incompatible with any 
imaginable human interest -- regardless of nationality, gender, race, or class -- so potent as a 
"remedy for anthropocentrism," that it resists explanation within the doctrines of social construc-
tivism. To be more precise, such cosmology resists explanation within the doctrines of social con-
structivism to the very considerable degree that those social-constructivist doctrines derive from 
the group politics of social identity. Put another way, such grim cosmology resists the doctrines 
social constructivists usually deploy to develop their sociology of knowledge. What recognizable 
group interests could scientists possibly be advancing in the "hermeneutic truth" that they repre-
sent as empirical truth -- or at least as an empirically verifiable hypothesis -- in predictions of 
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cosmic oblivion? Consider, for instance, the vista that UCLA chemist Lawrence Krauss opens for his 
readers when he explores the theoretical physics predicting that "even in an eternally expanding 
universe, life cannot persist forever" (278). In this grim perspective, "the very processes that cre-
ated the matter that makes up the universe of our experience will one day slowly return our dust 
to nothingness" (281). Not only do the relentless formulae and data of astrophysics tell us that our 
planet will "certainly" one day be "uninhabitable" (227), but they also script a far distant time 
when: "all memory of the star that sheltered [our] planet ... for a brief 10 billion years will have 
long disappeared. The memory of the galaxy that housed that sun will have long disappeared. 
Even the light from all of the stars in the universe may have long disappeared ... one day a single 
proton in [a single] atom will go poof. Then ... [a] second proton will die. The process will continue 
until ... all atoms in the universe are no longer ... [When] protons and neutrons cease to exist, 
they may in turn decay into electrons and their antiparticle partners, positrons. By this time, the 
universe will be too diffuse for electrons and positrons to find each other in the desert of largely 
empty space" (282-83). 
Long before astrophysicists ever offered such menacing predictions of the future, various 
homilists, preachers, and charismatics stirred widespread fear with prophesies of cataclysm. Such 
prophesies, however, always lent themselves to social constructivist interpretation because the 
prophets offered an escape, spiritual or temporal, usually through adherence to a church, party, or 
movement for which they spoke. In other words, their dire predictions served human interests in 
recognizable ways, so providing a comprehensible motives for the leaders -- usually, but not al-
ways, affluent white males -- of the hermeneutic dance these predictions choreographed. But 
when physicists now predict the utter dissolution of everything, they offer no escape. Indeed, 
Kraus writes resignedly of the impossibility of avoiding the "ultimately ... bad situation" which 
dooms all of human life (227). When scientists claim that their bleak cosmology results from the 
probing of objective reality with the most reliable mathematics verified through the most rigorous 
empirical experiments, they may not convince social constructivists. But how would social con-
structivists explain the work of these hopeless cosmologists? Such cosmologists steer entirely clear 
of the anthropocentric "myth of progress" for which Gray expresses such disdain. In the utter ab-
sence of any of the "shifting and crooked" human motives that Gray blames for deflecting science 
from the "disinterested pursuit of truth," science may truly offer the "remedy for anthropocen-
trism" Gray seeks. It is, however, precisely because it offers such a remedy to anthropocentrism 
that the science of cosmic despair defies explanation within social constructivism. For if it is "shift-
ing and crooked" human needs produce science that as an invention that serves to satisfy those 
needs, then we must ask just what human needs could ever be satisfied by cosmological predic-
tions of universal death. To be sure, social constructivists could make perfect sense of Friedrich 
Engels's rhetorical decision to exclude from his political theorizing the science that even in his day 
predicted a time when "the sun exhausts itself ... and finally there is not enough warmth for life 
itself ... [A]nd the earth becomes a dead, frozen globe, like the moon" (qtd. in Harrington 80). So-
cial constructivists can even explain the willingness of some modern scientists to ignore available 
empirical data -- to the acute annoyance and vexation of physicist Stanley Jaki -- as they have 
tried "to give eternity to the universe" (as Jaki puts it) by formulating "steady-state" and "oscillat-
ing" models for the universe, models formulated in the utter absence of supporting physical evi-
dence (78-79). In complaining about these colleagues' departure from a rigorously empirical sci-
ence, Jaki draws momentarily close to a social constructivist perspective when he concedes that 
"perhaps it would be too much to expect [these scientists] to be utterly candid about their ... mo-
tivations" for inventing cosmologies that are not so ultimately bleak, not so "intensely uncomforta-
ble to the human mind" (79). Because he recognizes how frequently "shifting and crooked" human 
motives prevent scientists from delivering "the remedy for anthopocentrism" that he so desires, 
Gray would see nothing novel in the invention of scientific models that deliver hope rather than 
experimental truth. These models do indeed seem to be semiotic creations intended for an inter-
est-governed hermeneutics; they clearly are not empirically verified works of objective science. 
Nonetheless, alongside the comforting cosmologies amenable to social constructivist explana-
tions remain the cosmologies that are far too "intensely uncomfortable to the human mind" to fit 
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within social constructivist orthodoxy without severely straining its founding assumptions about 
human motivation. Social constructivists could, of course, simply concede that while their theory of 
meaning can account for many, perhaps even most, of the products of science, a few scientific 
theories simply elude explanation within their doctrines. Gray himself seems to allow for precisely 
such a position when he laments that because they are in thrall to "shifting and crooked" human 
desires, science will "will never be used chiefly to pursue truth" (28), while still holding out the 
theoretical possibility that scientists may occasionally defy those human desires by forcing man-
kind to confront the disconcerting truths that will explode their ancient anthropocentric fantasies. 
Generally, however, social constructivists do not draw such limits on the applicability of their theo-
ries. When social constructivists insist, as they do, that the "truth" (and the intrusive quotation 
marks are obligatory within social constructivist skepticism) of "any proposition" depends upon 
social hermeneutics and social agreement and consensus, they allow for no exceptions. In refusing 
to concede that some propositions might not yield to explanation within their theory, social con-
structivists adopt a posture very different from that of leading scientists, who admit typically that 
certain types of questions defy the limits of their theories. Although the distinguished biologist and 
philosopher of science Peter Medawar, for instance, claims that "science is incomparably the most 
successful enterprise human beings have ever engaged upon" (65), he still admits to a "limit to 
science," a limit evident in its utter "to answer childlike elementary questions having to do with 
first and last things -- questions such as -- 'What are we all here for?' ... 'What is the point of liv-
ing?'" (59). Why do social constructivists -- unlike scientists such as Medawar -- admit to no limits 
on their theory of meaning? Social constructivists are simply working out the implications of their 
ultimate assumptions about the grounds of meaning.  
The literature and culture scholar J. Hillis Miller exposes perceptively these assumptions when 
he notes that "the disappearance of God" from modern thought means the disappearance of an 
"extrahuman foundation for man, nature, or society" (30-31). "When God is annihilated," Miller 
elaborates, "at the same time man annihilates himself and annihilates also the world around him. 
He annihilates them in the sense of hollowing them of any substantial presence" (32). Bereft of 
any divine or transcendent ground of meaning, humans must make "human subjectivity" itself "the 
foundation of all things, the only source of meaning and value in the world" (32). This radical shift 
in the perceived foundation of meaning "bring[s] into existence a society which generates its own 
immanent basis for meaning" (34). If society has replaced the transcendent God of Scripture as 
the ground of meaning, in the way Miller perceives, then society has become a type of surrogate 
deity. And precisely because Society has emerged as a surrogate deity, social constructivism has 
acquired the character of a surrogate theology. As the theologians for a surrogate deity, social 
constructivists must do what theologians have always done -- namely, adduce arguments demon-
strating the omniscience and omnipotence of their jealous god. To admit that social constructivism 
cannot account for some products of science (such as its bleak cosmology of ultimate dissolution) 
is to concede the inadequacy of Society as a surrogate deity capable of fully and completely 
"generat[ing] its own immanent basis for meaning" (Miller 34). To admit that social constructivism 
cannot account for that portion of science that offers a remedy to anthropocentrism is further to 
concede that social constructivism itself rests on thoroughly anthropocentric premises. Because its 
practitioners rarely make such concessions, social constructivism now threatens to become anoth-
er "religious philosophy of modernity" of the sort that historical theologian Alister McGrath sees 
becoming "a totalizing worldview which demand[s] that all else give way to its claims" (232). Long 
before social constructivists such as Schmidt, Maturana, Lepenies, and others began disparaging 
the truth claims of science, scientists found themselves besieged by the representatives of a dif-
ferent religious philosophy justifying a different "totalizing worldview." Galileo in particular found 
himself in peril before the Catholic Inquisition precisely because he claimed for science an access 
to objective truth entirely outside of ecclesiastical understanding and control. For those who 
viewed themselves as the only legitimate human representatives of the omnipotent and omniscient 
God of Scripture, Galileo's claim was blasphemously presumptuous. Today's social constructivists 
would recoil, naturally, from any comparison of their challenge to science and the Inquisitors' per-
secution of Galileo. But because they have taken over a quasi-theological task on behalf of Society 
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as a surrogate deity, it was entirely predictable that a revisionist historian would do precisely what 
Catholic apologist Wade Rowland has now done: namely, defend the seventeenth-century actions 
of Galileo's prosecutors by appropriating the twentieth-century doctrines of social constructivism. 
Invoking a central social constructivist doctrine, Rowland indicts Galileo for having fallen into a se-
rious error in his claim that "it is not in the power of any created being to make things true or 
false" (qtd. in Rowland 137). Galileo's prosecutors, Rowland argues, avoided this grievous error by 
realizing, as foolish Galileo did not, that "Scientists do not discover laws of nature, they invent 
them. Scientists do not observe 'nature in the raw' -- their observations are filtered through layers 
of subjective impression and social conditioning. Scientific 'facts' about nature are not preexisting 
truths, they are human constructs, the products of human minds. ... The truth that science 
'discovers' is not objective and immutable, it is subjective and socially contingent" (137). Rowland 
thus rejects as philosophically and socially dangerous Galileo's attempt to advance his radical 
worldview (in which the earth and its inhabitants lost their traditional centrality) as objective em-
pirical science entirely free of such social contingency.  
Social constructivists may wish to repudiate Rowland's astonishing use of their doctrines. But 
Rowland clearly knows and understands those doctrines. What is more, social constructivists may 
find it difficult to establish cogent reasons for repudiating Rowland's application of doctrines that 
cohere only when part of a totalizing surrogate theology that occupies the entire cultural space of 
the traditional totalizing theology it has supplanted. While it may offend most social constructiv-
ists, Rowland uses their doctrines in ways that are both consistent and logically coherent. After all, 
the Catholic Church was Society in seventeenth-century Southern Europe and therefore exercised 
society's power to generate meanings through the social consensus it created through persuasion -
- and coercive terror. Social constructivists have much to teach about how society shapes and in-
terprets the meanings of scientific enterprises. They can, with Gray, explain why "shifting and 
crooked" human desires often transform science into a support for socially palatable myths and 
illusions. They can explain, for instance, why some modern scientists cling to theories of an oscil-
lating or steady-state universe as an alternative to the bleak cosmologies of universal dissolution. 
But unless they wish to take over the cultural role of Inquisitors and so provide legitimacy for past 
Inquisitors, perhaps it is time that social constructivists acknowledged that at least when they ad-
vance cold, dark propositions serving no discernible self-interest, scientists may indeed move be-
yond the boundaries of their theory of meaning. 
 
Works Cited  
 
Atalay, Bulent. Math and the Mona Lisa: The Art and Science of Leonardo da Vinci. Washington: Smithsonian 
Institution P, 2004. 
Bailey, Richard. "Overcoming Veriphobia: Learning to Love Truth Again." British Journal of Educational Studies 
49 (2001): 159-72. 
Brian, Denis. Einstein: A Life. New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1996. 
Dewdney, A.K. Beyond Reason: Eight Problems that Reveal the Limits of Science. Hoboken: John Wiley & Sons, 
2004. 
Fernandez-Armesto, Felipe. Truth: A History and Guide for the Perplexed. New York: St. Martin's, 2001.  
Fogelin, Robert. Walking the Tightrope of Reason: The Precarious Life of a Rational Animal. New York: Oxford 
UP, 2003. 
Gray, John. Straw Dogs: Thoughts on Humans and Other Animals. London: Granta, 2002. 
Guba, Egon, and Yvonna S. Lincoln. Fourth Generation Evaluation. Newbury Park: Sage, 1989.  
Gellner, Ernest. Postmodernism, Reason and Religion. London: Routledge, 1992.  
Harrington, Michael. The Politics at God's Funeral: The Spiritual Crisis of Western Civilization. New York: Holt, 
Rinehart and Winston, 1983.  
Jaki, Stanley L. Angels, Apes, & Men. La Salle: Sherwood Sugden, 1983. 
King-Hele, P.G. "The Bakerian Lecture, 1974: A View of Earth and Air." Philosophical Transactions of the Royal 
Society of London. 278.1277 (1975): 67-109.  
Krauss, Lawrence M. Atom: An Odyssey from the Big Bang to Life on Earth ... and Beyond. Boston: Little, 
Brown, 2001. 
Maturana, Humberto. "Ontology of Observing." Chilean School of Biology of Cognition. Ed. Alfred Ruiz. (2005): 
<http://www.inteco.cl/biology/>. 
McGrath, Alister. The Twilight of Atheism: The Rise and Fall of Disbelief in the Modern World. New York: Dou-
bleday, 2004. 
Medawar, Peter. The Limits of Science. Oxford: Oxford UP, 1984. 
Miller, J. Hillis. The Form of Victorian Fiction. Notre Dame: U of Notre Dame P, 1968. 
Bryce Christensen, "The Problematics of a Social Constructivist Approach to Science"  page 9 of 9 
CLCWeb: Comparative Literature and Culture 7.3 (2005): <http://docs.lib.purdue.edu/clcweb/vol7/iss3/1> 
 
Pancaldi, Giuliano. Volta: Science and Culture in the Age of Enlightenment. Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 2003. 
Raymo, Chet. "Will Bobos Ever See Scientific Truth?" Boston Globe (17 July 2001): C2. 
Riegler, Alex. Radical Constructivism (2005): <http://www.radicalconstructivism.com>. 
Rowland, Wade. Galileo's Mistake: A New Look at the Epic Confrontation between Galileo and the Church. New 
York: Arcade, 2001.  
Schmidt, Siegfried J. "Interpretation: The Story Does Have an Ending." Poetics Today 21 (2002): 621-32. 
Tötösy de Zepetnek, Steven. "Constructivism and Comparative Cultural Studies." CLCWeb: Comparative Litera-
ture and Culture (Library) (2001): 
<http://clcwebjournal.lib.purdue.edu/library/totosy(constructivism).html>.   
 
Author's profile: Bryce Christensen teaches writing and literature at Southern Utah University. His current re-
search interests include the ethics of science, utopian literature, and the politics of the family. Christensen has 
published articles on cultural and literary issues in Philosophy and Literature (1982), Christianity and Literature 
(1986), Renascence (1988, 1991, 2002), and Modern Age (1996, 1998, 2001), and in various other scholarly 
journals. His book, Divided We Fall: Family Discord and the Fracturing of America, is forthcoming in the Fall of 
2005 from Transaction Books. E-mail: <christensenb@suu.edu>.  
 
